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Abstract
An important issue facing marketing cooperatives is that the overall quality of the
product depends on the quality of farm products provided by individual members. We
conduct an experiment to empirically investigate producer incentives to free-ride on
quality among members of a marketing cooperative in a setting where the average
quality provided by members of the cooperative results in a collective rent that is dis-
tributed back to members in a patronage dividend levied in proportion to the quantity
produced. Hidden actions by cooperative members that impact quality are imperfectly
monitored, but free-riding, when detected, results in exclusion from cooperative re-
turns. The randomized payoff structure of our game results in a novel experimental
design that nests public good games and multi-player assurance games. Our findings
indicate that free-riding on product quality is deterred when: (i) cooperatives base pa-
tronage dividends on quality outcomes of smaller groups; (ii) payoffs from free-riding
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are randomized by the possibility of exclusion from cooperative returns; and (iii) co-
operatives distribute a larger share of returns to members through indirect payments
such as capital pooling and cost sharing arrangements unrelated to product quality.
Key words: Free-riding, cooperative, experimental analysis, collective action game,
probability of exclusion.
JEL codes: Q13, L66, C92, D82
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Agricultural marketing cooperatives often promote premium product lines that emphasize
high-quality farm products. This focus on product quality has long been an objective among
marketing cooperatives in the wine industry, and is now emerging in other agricultural prod-
ucts sectors such as cheese and fruit and vegetable products.1 As cooperative organizations
continue to promote high-quality farm products, managing incentives to mitigate problems
among agents becomes increasingly important, as the return to individual effort depends on
the coordinated actions of all members of the cooperative to provide high-quality products.
For example, rents returned to members of a winemaking cooperative depend on the quality
of grapes contributed by individual vineyards.2 Providing incentives for high-quality pro-
duction is difficult when members face heterogeneous environmental conditions or have
different levels of skill, and this is particularly true when actions of individual producers
are unobserved (Me´rel, Saitone, and Sexton, 2015).
It has been well-known since Ho¨lmstrom (1979) that moral hazard results in subopti-
mal performance when collective rents depend on the hidden actions of individuals. The
resulting incentive problem in cooperative organizations is poorly remedied by grading
standards, because a minimum quality standard is only capable of controlling product qual-
ity at the lower tail of the quality distribution. In the case of a winemaking cooperative,
for example, individual producers can bundle low- and high-quality grapes at the minimum
quality threshold, while diverting high-quality grapes towards their own, branded labels
(see e.g. Planas, 2016).
Compared with investor-owned firms, members of marketing cooperatives have sev-
eral incentives to free-ride on product quality (see Pennerstorfer and Weiss, 2013). First,
because aggregating production economizes on harvesting cost, members of a cooperative
may not exert sufficient effort to segregate high-and low-quality products prior to grading.
Second, when idiosyncratic shocks reduce product quality on some acres but not on others,
farmers may choose to harvest all acreage to increase the share of output that qualifies for
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the patronage dividend. Because cooperative rents are determined jointly by the collective
effort of all members, such actions harm performance of the cooperative by diluting the
overall quality of the product mix. This article examines incentives for members of mar-
keting cooperatives to contribute high quality products in settings where individual effort
is unobserved.
We frame our analysis in the context of a multi-player, collective action experiment.
Individuals choose whether or not to contribute costly private action in return for a share of
a collective rent that depends on the joint contribution levels of all cooperative members.
Specifically, collective rents are distributed back to members through a patronage dividend
levied in proportion to the quantity of agricultural products contributed by each member,
irrespective of differences in product quality among members. Individuals choose whether
or not to incur additional cost to produce high-quality goods by undertaking an unobserved
action; however, members of the cooperative that choose not to engage in the costly ac-
tion face a random probability of detection, as would be the case for a cooperative that
engages in random sampling. We follow the literature on social sanctions (Tirole, 1996) by
modeling the penalty for detection as exclusion from the cooperative organization.
Our research relates to the experimental literature that considers exclusion in public
goods settings (see e.g. De Geest, Stranlund, and Spraggon, 2017; Maier-Rigaud, Martins-
son, and Staffiero, 2010; Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman, 2005); however, we depart
from this literature by considering exclusion in the form of social sanctions as opposed to
sanctions by peers.3 Our work builds on the strand of the experimental literature following
Swope (2002) and Croson et al. (2015) that considers exclusion through social sanctions,
although the context of their work, which considers public good provision through vol-
untary contribution mechanism (VCM), is quite different. In Swope (2002), exclusion is
applied to individuals who fail to meet a minimum contribution requirement, while in Cro-
son et al. (2015) only the smallest contributor is excluded. Our research relates closely
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to this work in the sense that the probability of exclusion through social sanctions turns a
pure public good game into a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria. A novel
aspect of our approach is that the coordination problem is driven by randomized exclusion
of individuals who do not contribute.
The structure of our game introduces a novel elements of coordination between players
that provides insights into individual behavior in cooperative settings. Specifically, our ex-
perimental framework nests several classes of multi-player collective action games accord-
ing to the randomized returns to free-riding. It reduces to a public good game in treatments
where payoffs are non-random, and to a multi-player assurance game (the so-called “stag
hunt”) under randomized payoffs from shirking. In groups with a “large” number of play-
ers, two Nash equilibria emerge: (i) one in which all players incur private costs to facilitate
collective returns; and (ii) one in which all players free-ride. We believe the assurance game
is particularly relevant to product quality outcomes in marketing cooperatives, because it
maintains the challenge of facilitating group cooperation while introducing coordination
issues among members.4,5
Our main findings are as follows. First, we extend the outcome found in experimental
literature that unobserved effort declines with group size to settings with random probabil-
ity of detection. Holding constant the marginal return from cooperating, previous studies
have found cooperation rates to be lower in larger groups (see Kollock, 1998 for a review).
Our analysis extends this result to settings with imperfect monitoring. When group size
increases from 4 players to 8 players, collective rents decline as individuals increasingly
shirk on effort to free-ride on the contributions of others. This finding has novel implica-
tions for eliciting effort to produce high-quality farm products in marketing cooperatives.
For example, in the case of profit-sharing among members of a cooperative, greater effort
among members can be facilitated by indexing compensation to the performance of indi-
vidual divisions within a cooperative, rather than to aggregate performance across many
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divisions, for instance by segmenting patronage dividends in a wine cooperative according
to the financial performance of individual varietals.
Second, we empirically investigate how randomized payoffs from shirking on quality
facilitate unobserved effort by cooperative members. For our “large group” treatment with
8 players, we demonstrate that introducing an exclusion probability in the collective action
game significantly induces individuals’ propensity to engage in costly, unobserved effort.
Whereas previous experiments on imperfect monitoring designs with sanctions by peers
(Ambrus and Greiner, 2012; Xiao and Kunreuther, 2016) report mixed results on the ability
of monitoring to deter shirking, our results provide striking evidence that designs based on
social sanctions in a cooperative substantially deter free-riding.6
Third, to our knowledge, our study is the first to examine how variation in the mag-
nitude of services provided by the cooperatives to individual members affects collective
effort.7 We show that services provided by a marketing cooperative that are independent
of the product quality objective result in enhanced effort among members, even when the
coordinated task generates relatively small collective returns. Providing services to assist
growers is an important aspect of wine cooperatives, which often help growers promote
desirable grape characteristics and adopt cultural practices that improve quality (Fares and
Orozco, 2014, Goodhue et al., 2003). Our findings demonstrate that services provided to
cooperative members that are independent of patronage refunds, such as capital pooling
and cost sharing for technical expertise, offer an important and heretofore unrecognized
mechanism to enhance the quality of goods sold in cooperatives.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In the next section we describe
how our work relates with the existing literature. In section 3 we present the theoretical
framework. In section 4, we describe the experimental design and procedure. In section 5
we present our experimental results, and in section 6 we conclude with final remarks.
6
Background
Our work contributes to the agricultural economics literature on product quality. A com-
mon objective of cooperative organizations is to promote producer welfare through col-
lective action, particularly as relayed to product quality (see Saitone and Sexton, 2010).
Winfree and McCluskey (2005), Fishman et al. (2015) and Castriota and Delmastro (2015)
examine settings in which individual farmers sell products under a collective label or a
collective brand. As in our framework, the collective rent an individual producer receives
depends on the joint effort of all producers, typically in the form of a price premium based
on average quality. We depart from this setting by considering individual contributions to
be unobservable and by analyzing how incentives introduced by cooperatives serve to deter
free riding behavior. An important literature exists on the free riding on quantity by cooper-
ative’s members, and a much smaller one exists on the free riding on quality.8 Pennerstorfer
and Weiss (2013) investigate free riding on quality (and quantity) by comparing incentives
in cooperatives with investor-owned companies. As in our study, the cooperative aggre-
gates the output of members into a composite product; however, an essential difference in
our setting is that members’ coordination on quality is endogenous.9
Our analysis is also related to the experimental literature that addresses cooperation (or
contribution) in social dilemmas (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma, public good or common pool
resource games) using various monitoring schemes based on sanctions by peers. This lit-
erature largely investigates the topic under conditions of monitoring (see e.g. Fehr and
Ga¨chter, 2000; Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson, and Staffiero, 2010), although a number of pa-
pers have considered imperfect monitoring ( Ambrus and Greiner, 2012; Xiao and Kun-
reuther, 2016).10 The monitoring mechanisms considered include costly punishment (Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2000), exclusion of the lowest contributor, either from the benefit (De Geest,
Stranlund, and Spraggon, 2017) or from future interactions (Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson,
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and Staffiero, 2010) and noisy interactions on the opponent’s moves or payoffs (see e.g.
Bereby-Meyer and Roth, 2006). Our analysis departs from this literature by modeling the
monitoring mechanism as a social sanction, which we believe is more relevant to under-
standing product quality contributions in marketing cooperatives than outcomes based on
laboratory experiments that rely on sanctions by peers.
The effect of social sanctions has been investigated in the experimental literature on
agency problems (see e.g. Nosenzo et al., 2016); however, this literature does not con-
sider collective rents from costly choices among individuals. Thus, our research combines
elements from two distinct strands of the literature. The effect of social sanctions in collec-
tive action games has received relatively little attention in the experimental literature (see
Swope, 2002 and Croson et al., 2015), and the few studies that consider social sanctions do
so under perfect monitoring. We depart from this line of inquiry by considering: (i) the ef-
fects of imperfect monitoring regimes characterized by randomized payoffs from shirking,
and (ii) variations in the base payoff level through member services. These novel mod-
eling elements provide a realistic setting for examining incentive problems for producing
high-quality products in marketing cooperatives.
The theoretical framework
Consider a group of N members of a marketing cooperative who seek to gain collective
rents from high quality products. Each member can produce at most one unit of the product
and simultaneously chooses between one of two actions, a high-effort activity (action A)
and a low-effort activity (action B). These actions have corresponding costs cA and cB,
respectively, where we assume that cA > cB.
Together, the collective effort of the cooperative members produces an overall qual-
ity level, ρ(NA) = NA/N , where NA denotes the number of players selecting action A.
Overall quality is an increasing function of collective effort, but the effort level of each
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individual member is not revealed to the cooperative other than by random chance (as dis-
cussed below).
The cooperative’s product is purchased by a group of M consumers (M ≥ N ). Each
consumer chooses to purchase either one unit of the good supplied by the cooperative at
price α, one unit of the standard good in a competitive market at price β = cB, or no
good at all. We assume that consumers evaluate the average quality ρ(NA) of the product
as in Fulton and Giannakas, 2004 and Hamilton and Zilberman, 2006, and are willing to
pay V + ρ(NA)a for products of such quality, where V refers to the utility derived from
consuming a standard good and a refers to consumers’ taste for quality, as in a Mussa and
Rosen-type utility function. Consumer utility is given by:
(1)

U = V + ρ(NA)a− α when the consumer buys the cooperative’s product,
U = V − β when the consumer buys the standard product,
U = 0 otherwise.
The cooperative sets α at the reservation price of consumers, β + ρ(NA)a,11 and dis-
tributes sales revenue to members through patronage dividends. Notice that each member
receives ρ(NA)a, i.e. the patronage dividend depending on the realized quality of the good
produced by the cooperative, which, in turn, is determined by the collective effort of all
members. Cooperative members also receive a base payoff p = β + S independent of
the collective returns from product quality, with S represent various services in addition to
patronage dividends, for instance by pooling resources for capital equipment and sharing
technical expertise.12 We model the services provided by the cooperative as a base payoff,
that is independent of the collective returns from product quality. Therefore, choosing ac-
tion A generates both a base payoff, p, and an additional product quality rent, ρ(NA)a,13
which depends on the coordinated action of all members.14 The collective rent is strictly
increasing in the share of players engaged in the high effort activity.
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Without loss of generality, we set β = cB = 0, such as the base payoff is only given by
the value of cooperative services (p = S). Moreover, to guarantee positive demand when
all members choose actionA (i.e. NA = N ) in a cooperative that prices at marginal cost cA,
we assume the mild regularity condition that the collective rent exceeds the cost of effort,
a > cA. If this was not true, consumer net utility from purchasing the high-quality good at
marginal cost would be V + a− cA < V , and a high-quality goods market could not exist.
Both the base payoff and collective rent are received by all cooperative members irre-
spective of their individual effort, except under circumstances of exclusion. We assume that
members choosing action B that attempt to sell their product to a high-quality cooperative
face a random probability of detection. If a member is “caught” engaging in action B, his
output is excluded from the cooperative’s production (market A) and his gain is then given
by the sale of his output on the competitive market at price cB.15 Formally, our model is
directly analogous to a collective action game for a club good, which is consistent with
the interpretation of a marketing cooperative as solving a mechanism design problem for
provision of a club good (see Hueth, 2014).
Notice, by design, that choosing action B involves identical payoffs to choosing action
A with two exceptions: (i) action B involves no cost (cB = 0), which makes shirking
attractive; and (ii) action B, if detected, leads to exclusion from the group returns in the
higher-yielding market for products produced by action A. A member randomly detected
in action B also suffers a loss of services p provided by the cooperative.
The incentive structure of the model can be seen by considering the value of the collec-
tive rent. As more members choose action A, the payoff to each member of the cooperative
increases. Specifically, each member choosing A receives the following return:
(2) ΓA(NA) = p+ ρ(NA) a− cA.
It follows immediately, absent exclusion, that the individual payoff for choosing action
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B is larger for any level of collective effort, because the low-effort activity entails no cost.
Absent a probability of exclusion, the payoff to a player choosing action B is
(3) ΓB(NA) = p+ ρ(NA) a > ΓA(NA).
Notice that the payoff from both action A and action B decreases as more members
engage in action B, as this behavior reduces the collective rent, ρ(NA)a. Accordingly,
the decision to choose A or B for each member depends on the decisions of the other
(N − 1) members to contribute effort. To see this, consider a “late-arriving” member who
can decide on an action after observing the actions selected by all other members.
Suppose a late-arriving member observes m other players selecting action A. If the
member also chooses A, then number of members coordinating on action A is m + 1 and
the payoff from action A will be ΓA(m + 1). Conversely, if the late-arriving member
chooses action B, the payoff is given by ΓB(m). Therefore, the payoff maximizing choice
of a late-arriving member is driven by the comparison between these two payoffs: A payoff-
maximizer would opt for action A when ΓA(m+1) > ΓB(m), and otherwise opt for action
B.
To make this example concrete, consider a two-player game in which m = 1. In this
case, the late-arriving player that observes his group mate playing actionA faces the payoffs
ΓA(2) = p+ a− cA and ΓB(1) = p+ a2 , so that the payoff maximizing choice is action A
whenever a > 2cA.
Our framework encompasses the essential coordination problem in collective action
games. By construction, the welfare of the collective is always higher when all members
choose action A, because the collective rent exceeds the cost of effort, a > cA; however,
this action may work against the self-interest of individuals. In the 2-player case described
above, for example, a payoff maximizer would wish to defect to action B whenever 2cA >
a > cA, even though such behavior works against the social interest.
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In general, ΓA(m + 1) > ΓB(m), ∀m ∈ [0, N − 1] is satisfied when the number of
players is sufficiently small, N < a
cA
, such that choosing action A is the dominant strategy
irrespective of what the other (N−1) players are doing. Conversely, ΓA(m+1) < ΓB(m),
∀m ∈ [0, N − 1] holds when the number of players is sufficiently large, N > a
cA
, in which
case action B becomes the dominant strategy of all players. In the “large group” case,
the framework reduces to a prisoners’ dilemma game with a one-shot Nash equilibrium
involving coordination on action B. Thus, our framework nests two important classes of




In practice, social sanctions and legal institutions often exist that limit individuals from
engaging in actions that work against the social interest. For example, workers caught
shirking on the job can be terminated and firms selling mislabeled products at premium
prices may be liable to compensate consumers for harms. In the present setting, such
sanctions among cooperative members exist when a cooperative member caught providing
quality below a minimum standard has his output excluded from production. In general,
enforcing against such behavior is problematic, because individuals that shirk are difficult
to catch.
We denote the detection frequency for individuals engaged in the low-effort action with
the random variable, θ. Following Tirole (1996), we interpret θ as the probability of exclu-
sion from the collective rent.
When members engaged in action B are faced with a probability of exclusion, the
payoff from action B is 0 with probability θ and ΓB(NA) > 0 with probability 1− θ.
The final decision of a player is driven by the comparison of the following payoffs:
(4)

ΓA(m+ 1) = p+ ρ(m+ 1) a− cA when the member chooses A
ΓB(m) = (1− θ) [p+ ρ(m) a] when the member chooses B.
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As in the case with non-randomized payoffs, ΓA(m+ 1) > ΓB(m) and action A is the
dominant strategy when N < a
cA
, and this remains true for any permissible values of m
and θ. Under randomized payoffs, action A can remain the dominant strategy for “large”
groups, N > a
cA
, but only in cases where the probability of exclusion is sufficiently large.
Specifically, the framework reduces to a prisoners’ dilemma game in which action B is






(a+p)N−a , whereas contributing effort towards








Randomized returns to choosing action B introduces a new and third class of game.
When N > a
cA
and θ ∈ [θ1(N), θ2(N)] the model has multiple equilibria: the socially
optimal outcome and the prisoner’s dilemma outcome.16 The framework reduces to a
multi-player assurance game (a “stag hunt”) with two pure-strategy equilibria. Specifi-
cally, letting n˜(N) ≡ N(cA−θp)−a
aθ
, the dominant strategy is action B for NA ∈ [0, n˜(N)],
whereas the dominant strategy is action A for NA ∈ [n˜(N), N − 1] (see Dixit, Skeath, and
Reiley, 2009). In our symmetric payoff game, a Nash equilibrium exists for any value of
NA > n˜(N) in which all players contribute, NA = N . Conversely, for any value of NA <
n˜(N), a Nash equilibrium exists in which all players choose action B, resulting in zero
contributions to the collective good, NA = 0.17
Our observations above on the framework can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1 When N < a
cA
and θ ∈ [0, 1] the one-shot Nash equilibrium involves all mem-
bers selecting action A. When N > a
cA
, three equilibrium configurations emerge: (i) for
∀θ ∈ [0, θ1(N)] the one-shot Nash equilibrium involves all members selecting action B;
(ii) for ∀θ ∈ [θ1(N), θ2(N)] multiple Nash equilibria emerge in a multi-player assurance
game over actions A and B; and (iii) for ∀θ ∈ [θ2(N), 1] the one-shot Nash equilibrium
involves all members choosing action A.
It is possible to further elaborate on the payoff-maximizing equilibrium outcomes in the
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case of a multi-player assurance game. GivenN > a
cA






















|. Thus, we arrive at:
Lemma 2 When N > a
cA
, increasing the base payoff, p: (i) increases the range of θ where
the social optimum is achieved in the one-shot Nash equilibrium; (ii) reduces the range of
θ where the framework reduces to a prisoners’ dilemma; and (iii) reduces the range of θ
that results in a multi-player assurance game.
Experimental design
To empirically test the predicted outcomes of our model, we employ a between-subjects
experimental design. In this section, we describe our treatments and derive equilibrium
predictions of the model.
Experimental treatments and parameters
Our experiment presents subjects with various forms of the model detailed above. Subjects
were told that they had to choose between action A or action B, and that all members
of their group had to make a simultaneous choice over a problem identical to the one they
were facing. Subjects were informed of the number of subjects in their group, but not of the
identities of group members, and communication with other subjects during the sessions
was not allowed. Subjects were informed that the composition of their group would remain
fixed over all periods of the session. Each subject played the game for 20 periods and the
number of periods to be played was common information.18
We control for subjects’ attitudes towards risk using the Holt and Laury (2002) risk
tests. We administer the test before and after the collective action game to control possible
order effects.19
Subjects were given a payoff table and encouraged to use them before making their
choices. This table showed the payoff for the period when choosing A or B, according to
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the number other members in their group deciding to play A or B. To build payoff tables
for the experiment, we used the following parameter values: p = cA = 2, p = 2, cA = 4,
cB = 0, a = 10 such that:
∗ for N = 4 and p = 2, only one Nash equilibrium exists in which all players adopt
action A;
∗ for N = 8 and p = 2, multiple equilibria exist with an equilibrium partition defined
by θ1 = 0.07 and θ2 = 0.375.20
∗ for N = 8 and p = 4, multiple equilibria exist with an equilibrium partition defined
by θ1 = 0.059 and θ2 = 0.187.21
To test the effects of the group size, the exclusion probability and the fixed payoff on
equilibrium behavior, we vary the values ofN , θ and p across treatments. Thus, a treatment
is defined by a triplet [N ; θ; p]. For example, the treatment [4; 0.25; 2] corresponds to
experimental sessions conducted with groups of 4 subjects, with an exclusion probability
of θ = 0.25 and a fixed payoff p = 2.
We employ a between-subjects procedure. Because Lemma 1 suggests that both the
number of subjects and the value of θ affect the optimal coordination strategy of players,
we design 8 experimental treatments with p = 2 that varies the size N of the group, N =
[4; 8], and the exclusion probability, θ = [0; 0.05; 0.25; 0.45], with values that span all
the equilibrium partitions of the N = 8 subject game. Because Lemma 2 suggests that
increasing the fixed payoff p modifies the equilibrium partition for N sufficiently large, we
design 2 more experimental treatments with p = 4 and N = 8 only: one with θ = 0.25 and
the other one with θ = 0.45. We consider treatments [4; 0; 2] and [8; 0; 2] as “benchmark”
treatments.
The payoff tables presented to the subjects (see examples in the appendix) display all
the possible payoffs for every combination of own and others’ choices.22 In treatments in
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which the payoff to action B was randomized, the payoff table displayed that the choice of
B could lead to a zero payoff with probability θ. For example, in treatments [8; 0.25; 2]
or [8; 0.25; 4], subjects were told that if they chose B they had a 0.75 chance of receiving
a positive payoff and a 0.25 chance of receiving no payoff at all.23 To avoid introducing
biases in subjects’ risk preferences, the resulting expected payoff for action B was not
calculated and displayed in the payoff table.
The subject’s payoff from the experiment was comprised of the cumulative payoff over
20 periods. Each subject was credited each period with a payoff in “Ecus” corresponding to
the frequency of actionA choices among members of her group (including her own choice).
The “Ecu” is the currency used for the game in the experiment, which was settled at the
end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 1,250 Ecus. After each period, each
subject was informed of her decision, the frequency of A choices in her group (including
her own choice), her own payoff, and her cumulative payoff since the beginning of the
experiment. Payoffs in each period were independent of choices made in previous periods,
although each subject could see the entire history of choices and payoffs in previous periods
throughout the experiment.
Predictions
Based on both Lemmas 1 and 2 the equilibria predictions of the game played are:
Prediction 1 The effect of N
An increase in the number of players reduces the frequency of selecting action A. Specif-
ically: (i) For N = 4 a payoff-maximizing player would choose action A irrespective
of the level of θ; and (ii) for N = 8 a payoff-maximizing player would choose action
B (action A) whenever θ ≤ θ1 = 0.07 (θ ≥ θ2 = 0.375). For intermediate ranges of
θ1 < θ = 0.25 < θ2, either equilibrium configuration is possible.
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For the N = 4 treatment, parameter values are selected such that self-interested indi-
viduals choose action A irrespective of the level of θ. For the N = 8 treatment, individual
payoffs are expected to be higher under action B that action A when θ = 0 and θ = 0.05.
Thus, we postulate that increasing the number of players reduces the incentive to choose
action A.
Prediction 2 The effect of θ
For intermediate values of θ, players are confronted with a coordination problem in the
equilibrium choices that modifies their incentive to choose action A. For N = 8, θ = 0.25
and p = 2 the collective action game reduces to a multi-player assurance game in which
multiple Nash equilibrium exist.
For intermediate values of θ, the players face a coordination problem in attaining an
equilibrium, as the game structure becomes a multi-player assurance game. Lemma 2
establishes that increasing p increases the region of θ where the social optimum is achieved.
In order to test this result a treatment [8; 0.25; 4] is conducted by considering p = 2 and
cA = 4. For such a value of p the partition of equilibrium is defined by θ1 = 0.059 and
θ2 = 0.187. Thus we have:
Prediction 3 The effect of p
Increasing the base payoff p increases the proportion of players choosing A. For N = 8,
θ = 0.25 and p = 4 all players would participate in action A; however, for N = 8,
θ = 0.25 and p = 2 the coordination problem remains.
This prediction postulates that increasing the base payoff p from belonging to a group
helps players avoid the coordination problem in attaining the socially optimal equilibrium,
thereby reducing the incentive to free ride. Figure 1. describes this outcome. Increasing the
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base payoff facilitates coordination on action A, even though p is independent of the mag-
nitude of the collective rent arising from action A, by squeezing together the boundaries
defined by θ1 and θ2. Raising the base payment provided to players makes social sanctions
more salient, thereby facilitating coordinated actions.
Experimental procedure
When subjects arrived in the laboratory, they received a personal code to preserve their
anonymity and were randomly assigned to a computer station. The laboratory consisted of
16 working stations and each session involved anonymous matching of subjects into either
four groups of 4 players or two groups of 8 players. Each session of the experiment cor-
responded to a single treatment and we adopt a between subjects design in which subjects
participated in a singular treatment with fixed group composition. Subjects were informed
that the composition of their group would remain fixed over all periods of the session and
that no interaction between the group members would be permitted.
Each subject was provided with an envelope at their station containing a show-up fee of
5 euros. Before the actual experiment started, the experimenter read the instructions aloud
to the subjects. In addition, subjects were able to read these instructions on their individual
screen, which clearly identified that the instructions were identical for all participants.
To ensure that the subjects understood the instructions, they were asked to complete a
questionnaire to assess their understanding of the game and the meaning of the variables,
profit calculations, etc. The questionnaires were then marked by and along with the exper-
imenter before the experiment started. Participants had complete information on their own
and others’ payoffs among members of their group and were provided with payoff tables
corresponding to the ones depicted in the previous section. The subjects were informed
that the game would be repeated exactly 20 times.
To ensure non-hypothetical decisions, the subjects were informed at the beginning of
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each session that they would anonymously be paid cash at the end of the experiment in an
amount that depended on the decisions they made and on the decisions made by others.
Subjects could earn between 8.4 and 28.7 Euros including the show up fee, their payoff for
the collective action game,24 and their payoff for the risk elicitation task.25
At the end of the experiment, subjects filled in a small questionnaire asking them basic
demographic information. At this point, the subjects could see their total payoff from the
experiment. Finally, they were called one by one in a separate room to receive privately
their money in cash, after which they were free to leave the lab.26 Each session lasted
approximately 75 minutes, including time devoted to the subjects’ payment.
To test predictions 1 (effect of N ) and 2 (effect of θ), we conducted 16 experimental
sessions from February 2014 to May 2014, with a total of 244 subjects (Female: 155, Male:
89). To test the prediction 3 (effect of p, with p = 2cA = 4), which concerns only subjects
in the N = 8 treatments, we conducted an additional set of 8 experimental sessions over
March-April 2015 with a total of 128 subjects (Female: 89, Male: 39). In this new set of
experiments, we performed treatments with θ = 0.25 but also with θ = 0.45.27 Subjects
were undergraduates from different universities (arts, sciences, social sciences, engineering
schools) with no background in game theory.
The entries in Table 1 provide data about each session and the number of observations
in our sample. Because we rely on fixed partner matching, each group can be considered
as a statistically independent observation. The experiment was designed to provide at least
4 observations per treatment.
Results
In this section we present the results of our experiment. We start with an overview of our
data, where we provide initial evidence supporting our predictions. We proceed with the
results of non-parametric tests on our treatment groups and, finally, we present and discuss
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the results of our econometric estimations.
Descriptive results
Our theoretical model and our experimental procedure suggests three clear predictions. We
expect to observe: (i) an increase in the level of free riding or shirking (i.e., choosing B)
with an increase in the number of group members; (ii) greater cooperation (choosing A)
with an increase in the exclusion probability; and (iii) a reduction of the level of free riding
with larger base payoffs.
Figure 2 depicts the mean frequency of free riding behavior (i.e., action B choices)
across periods for sessions with N = 4 and N = 8 players. As expected, the levels of free
riding are “small” (below 10%) in the treatments with small groups, whereas for the large
group treatments, the frequency of action B choices is slightly above 30%. This provides
preliminary evidence for our first prediction on the effect of group size.
It should be noted that our experimental design does not enable us to disentangle
changes in cooperative behavior from changes in group reputation effects among subjects
in the experiment as group size increases. If subjects differ in their willingness to cooper-
ate, then it is possible that subjects develop reputations for cooperation within groups that
are easier to identify in smaller groups. Thus, an alternative explanation for the coordi-
nation problem when N gets larger is that small groups better facilitate reputation effects
between subjects in the experiment.
Turning to our results on the probability of exclusion, Figure 3 shows the effects of θ
on the levels of free riding for the sub-sample of our data with 8 players involved in the
game and with the lower level of base payoff. Notice that when we introduce an exclusion
probability, the level of free riding increases, but then decreases to levels identical to the
case where N = 4 when there is a 45% probability of exclusion from the rent. It is clear
by inspection that the mean free riding level is reduced almost in half as the exclusion
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probability increases to 45%. Figure 3. thus provides initial support for Prediction 2 that
purely self-interested players will select action A whenever θ ≥ θ2 = 0.375.
Finally, we inspect the effects of a higher base payoff on the level of free riding on the
collective rent. This is reported in Figure 4, where we plot the effect of doubling on the
base payoff, on mean free ride when there is a 25% probability of exclusion from the rent.
The figure suggests that to an increase in base payoff corresponds a decrease in shirking,
which is in line with our theoretical prediction and preliminary evidence supporting our
Prediction 3
Treatment effects
We conduct non-parametric tests on our different treatments. Specifically, we examine
whether there are significant differences between the group size and random payoff treat-
ments using both the Kruskall-Wallis equality of population rank test and Mann-Whitney
test. Comparing the choice of action B across the number of subjects and the different
levels of θ, the Kruskall-Wallis equality of population rank test indicates significant differ-
ences at the 1% level between the population according the group size (Chi square (1) =
14.545 and p-value=0.0001), while for the levels of θ the difference is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level (Chi square (3) = 14.451 and p-value=0.0024).
To compare outcomes across the treatments, we treat the outcome of each group as an
independent variable and conduct the Mann-Whitney test for the average frequency of free
riding. Recall that we refer to the treatments using the notations [N ; θ; p], for instance [4;
0.25; 2] corresponds to the treatment [N = 4; θ = 0.25; p = 2].
For theN = 4 player case, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference
in the frequency of free riding between the control treatment and the treatments in cases
where payoffs to action B are randomized (p-value=0.132, [4; 0; 2] vs [4; 0.05; 2]; p-
value=0.774, [4; 0; 2] vs [4; 0.25; 2]; p-value=0.773, [4; 0; 2] vs [4; 0.45; 2]).28 A large
majority of subjects play action A when there are 4 players in a group, which is consistent
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with Prediction 1(i) that subjects in “small” groups do not change their collective actions
significantly following perturbations in the level of θ.
For the treatment where there were N = 8 subjects, the behavioral patterns differ
consistently. Comparing across θ < θ1 = 0.07 treatments (that is when θ = 0 or θ = 0.05),
free riding behavior does not change significantly (p-value=0.771, [8; 0; 2] vs [8; 0.05;
2]); however, pooling across groups, the majority of free riding behavior occurs in these
two treatments. The average frequency of choosing action B is 54.8% in treatment [8; 0;
2] and 51.8% in treatment [8; 0.05; 2], while the average frequency of choosing action
B is 36.25% in treatment [8; 0.25; 2] and 27.08% in treatment [8; 0.45; 2]. This result
provides evidence in support of Prediction 1(ii). On the other hand, the null hypothesis
of equal frequencies of free-riding across pairwise treatments is strongly rejected by the
Mann-Whitney test (p-value=0.014, [8; 0; 2] vs [8; 0.25; 2]; p-value=0.009, [8; 0; 2] vs [8;
0.45; 2]; p-value=0.013, [8; 0.05; 2] vs [8; 0.25; 2]; p-value=0.009, [8; 0.05; 2] vs [8; 0.25;
2]). These results confirm that the extent of free-riding behavior decreases significantly for
higher values of the exclusion probability. The null hypothesis of equal free-riding is also
rejected for the high detection treatments (p-value=0.09, [8; 0.25; 2] vs [8; 0.45; 2]), albeit
more weakly. For a high value of the exclusion probability (θ = 0.45), it is clear that a
large majority of subjects tend to play action A. This provides some evidence in support of
Prediction 2 that players’ incentive to free ride is affected by the coordination problem.
The Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in the frequency of
actionB between the treatments [8; 0.25; 2] and [8; 0.25; 4] (p-value=0.03). Pooling across
groups, the average frequency of choosing action B is 36.25% when p = 2, whereas it is
26.4% when p = 4, which provides preliminary evidence in support of Prediction 3 that an
increase in the value of the base payoff reduces the propensity of players to free-ride. On
the other hand, the Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no difference
in the frequency of action B between the treatment [8; 0.25; 4] and the treatment [8, 0.45;
22
2] (p-value=0.76). Pooling the groups, the average frequency of choosing B is 26.4% in
[8; 0.25; 4] whereas it is 27.08% in [8; 0.45; 2]. This result suggests that an increase in
p may have the same positive effect on players’ coordination on action A than an increase
in θ. Altogether, variation in the base payoff reveals that base income is an important
determinant of collective behavior in settings with the possibility of exclusion.29
Econometric results
To further our empirical inquiry we make use of the pseudo-panel structure of our data and
resort to standard panel data techniques to test our hypotheses. Note that the subjects in
our experiment were randomly selected and allocated to each of our treatments. Specif-
ically, each subjects was randomly allocated to each treatment and were only exposed to
one treatment. Moreover all our sessions were conducted in the same lab and with identical
conditions. Thus, we can assume that our observations are independent across treatments
and sessions.30 Our econometric strategy allows us to explore the independence of obser-
vations (Houser, 2008; Frechette, 2012). Because subjects in our experiment were asked to
make dichotomous choices over a collective action, we resort to limited dependent variable
panel data analysis in line with the approach in Rojas (2012). The fact that our subjects
were only exposed to one treatment has two consequences: the first is that we cannot use
fixed effects models because we have collinearity across periods and subjects; the second
is that it is reasonable to assume the covariates are unrelated with subjects heterogeneity
(Greene, 2008). For these reasons we obtain our results in this section using a random
effects Probit model of the form:31
(5) Pr(yit = 1 | xit) = Φ(xitβ + υi),
where yit takes the unit value when the subject selects the choice B (i.e. to shirk), xit is
a vector of independent variables, υi is an iid error term, and Φ is the standard normal
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distribution. All our model estimations used robust standard errors clustered by group.32
We interpret our dependent variable as the propensity to free ride or shirking on the col-
lective rent. Variables in xit include dummies accounting for the different treatments and
a subject specific risk measurement variable.33 The variable N accounts for the group size
effects and takes unit value for the N = 8 player group. We introduce dummy variables to
account for treatment effects with different exclusion probability, denoted θ5, θ25 and θ45,
respectively, for a 5%, 25% and 45% probability of exclusion, and interpret our results in
reference to the case of a zero probability of exclusion (θ = 0).
Recall that we randomly assigned subjects to one of 3 treatments that vary in group
size, in the exclusion probability, and in the base payoff of individuals. Each of our 372
subjects made choices over 20 periods of play, resulting in a total of 7,440 observations.
The effect of N on mean collective effort
We examine the effect ofN on the mean effort level of individuals using all the observations
in our panel data. Table 2. shows 3 models, the first examines the effect of N in isolation,
then the second model examines the effect of a time trend and finally model 3 includes a
linear and a quadratic time trend. The time trend variables are included to assess the impact
of learning. As the table shows, there is not a significant difference in the coefficients of the
mean free riding across the models. Model 3 provides the best fit to the data, suggesting
that collective effort decreases at a decreasing rate in the number of rounds. Consistent with
our first theoretical prediction, increasing the number of players in the group statistically
significantly increases the propensity to shirk.
The effect of θ on mean collective effort
The second prediction of our model is that introducing a mechanism to identify and exclude
shirking individuals from the collective rent reduces the propensity to shirk. As we show
in Section 2, rent exclusion mechanisms are particularly effective when there is a larger
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number of participants in the group. Tables 3. and 4. respectively report the coefficients
from our Probit model on shirking behavior and the marginal effects of covariates.
In Table 3., the first two models are estimated for the whole sample and include time
trend variables and the risk aversion variable (model 2). Model 3 includes only observa-
tions where N = 8 and where the base payoff is at the lower end of the range.34 For the
estimation of models 4 and 5 we used data from all sessions that contain 8 members in a
group. Note that in the base payoff treatments we double the value of p and we introduced
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when p takes a higher value. Models 2 through 5
include a variable to account for individual risk attitudes. This variable is statistically sig-
nificant and has the expected sign, although its magnitude is rather low. Thus, controlling
for risk attitudes does not substantially alter the coefficients on our treatment variables, an
outcome consistent with findings in experiments conducted in strategic settings (Eckel and
Wilson, 2004; Houser, Schunk, and Winter, 2010).35
Model 1 is similar to model 3 in Table 2., but now includes the exclusion probabilities.
Recall that the exclusion probabilities are in terms of the baseline θ = 0. The model clearly
shows that an increase in the exclusion probability significantly decreases the propensity to
shirk, consistent with Prediction 2. Moreover, notice that there is no significant difference
in shirking behavior in the case of 0% and 5% probability of exclusion, an outcome that is
consistent with Prediction 1. Turning to the marginal effects, table 4., shows that doubling
the number of players increases the propensity to free ride by 32.6%, whereas a 25% and a
45% probability of rent exclusion, respectively, decreases the proportion of free riding by
15 and 24%.
Focusing on the sub-sample of our data with both eight players and p = 2, Model 3
shows rent exclusion is an effective mechanism to reduce the propensity to shirk. In fact,
both probabilities of rent exclusion statistically and significantly reduce the rate of free rid-
ing when N = 8. Note that by examining the marginal effects on table 4. and as suggested
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in our models, the rent exclusion mechanism is particularly effective in incentivizing coop-
eration in large groups. The results reported in Model 3 provide strong evidence in support
of Prediction 2, as an increase in the value of θ reduces shirking.
Taken together models 1, 2 and 3 in table 3. provide evidence in support of our second
prediction. Across all the models, the θ treatment variables are strongly significant (with
the exception of θ = 0.05, which is consistent with Prediction 1ii).
The effect of p on mean collective effort
Monitoring and enforcement is a costly activity and, as our results show, there may a di-
minishing return to investments on punishing defecting agents. Thus, a combination of a
carrot-and-stick policy might more effectively reduce the propensity to free ride as sug-
gested in Prediction 3 above. We examine this prediction in models 4 and 5 of Table 3.36.
First, focusing on model 4, it is clear that including the treatments with a higher base payoff
changes the magnitude of coefficients in the model and increase the values of the marginal
effects. This suggests that the exclusion probabilities become more effective under higher
payoffs (recall that the payment is forfeited when an individual is caught shirking).
Model 5 introduces the base payoff variable, which accounts for a higher fixed compo-
nent of the rent from the collective reputation in the estimation. This covariate is statisti-
cally significantly and reduces the propensity to shirk as we hypothesized. Examining the
marginal effects for models 4 and 5 in Table 4, it is clear that there seems to be a carrot-
stick trade-off, as when we introduce the base payoff variable in the estimation the marginal
effects of the probabilities of rent exclusion decrease to levels similar to those in model 3,
while the increase in the fixed part of the payment to players reduces free riding by more
that 12%. These results provide evidence supporting our Prediction 3.
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Concluding Remarks and Management Implications
In this article we develop a framework to examine free-riding behavior on the quality of
farm production in cooperative organizations. We construct and implement a multi-player
collective action game in a controlled laboratory setting to analyze players’ incentives to
contribute collective effort towards group returns. We consider an imperfect monitoring
design based on small detection frequencies that result in the potential for social sanc-
tions. The discriminating features of our approach are that the collective rent depends on
the coordinated investment of all players and the payoff from free-riding is randomized
by an exogenous probability of exclusion. The laboratory setting results in a rich design
framework that encompasses both a public good game and a multi-player assurance game.
The games have different equilibrium outcomes, which allows us to systematically explore
alternative policies to obtain the social optimum.
Our main testable hypotheses are as follows: (i) when the number of players is small, a
pure public good game arises in which purely self-interested players incur costly effort to
contribute to collective rents; (ii) when there is a large number of players and no exclusion
probability, the game becomes a prisoners’ dilemma in which the dominant strategy is to
shirk on effort that generates collective rents; (iii) when there is a large number of players
and a positive exclusion probability, the game reduces to a multi-player assurance game
with multiple equilibria in which the Nash equilibrium involves coordinated effort for larger
values of the exclusion probability; and (iv) when there is a large number of players and
a positive exclusion probability, increasing the payoff individuals received independent of
the collective rent leads to greater coordination.
To test our hypotheses, we develop a novel experimental protocol that nests a public
good game when payoffs from free-riding are certain and a multi-player assurance game
when a positive probability of exclusion results in randomized payoffs from free-riding.
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Subjects were put in groups of 4 or 8 players and chose whether to incur a hidden cost
to increase a collective rent. All the players in the group had to make their choice simul-
taneously and the magnitude of the collective rent depended on the coordination of effort
across individuals. The groups of 4 and 8 players were further divided into four treatments
corresponding to different probabilities of exclusion.
Our results indicate significant differences in the propensity to shirk on unobserved cost
in larger groups of 8 players than in small groups of 4 players. In treatments with 8 players,
we find collective effort significantly increases above a threshold level of the exclusion
probability. Thus, the threat of being excluded from the collective rent significantly impacts
behavior in the manner suggested by Tirole (1996)’s theory of collective reputation.
We also find that the contribution of unobserved costs by members towards collective
rents is facilitated by the presence of a base payoff that is independent of returns from the
coordinated outcome. Indeed, holding constant the size of the collective rent, we demon-
strate that individuals who receive a larger base payoff contribute significantly higher effort
to cooperative returns.
Our findings have a number of important management implications for cooperatives
marketing strategies. First, our framework suggests returns to decentralizing management
tasks. We find cooperative effort levels to be higher in smaller groups than in larger ones,
which implies it may be possible to attain higher overall effort levels within a cooperative
organization by sub-dividing production into a number of smaller divisions, for instance
regional labels, where collective rents determined through profit-sharing arrangements can
be organized among smaller groups. For instance, a wine cooperative may market several
premium wines based on region-of-production and varietal to limit the number of members
involved in each premium wine. Our findings suggest that such a strategy would enhance
the quality contributed by all cooperative members.
Second, when members face a positive probability of being excluded from cooperative
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returns when shirking is detected, we find that even a “small” exclusion probability sig-
nificantly increases coordination among members. This outcome emphasizes the essential
role of social sanctions within marketing cooperatives in facilitating collective rents, an
outcome that is broadly consistent with the theory of collective reputation.
Finally, marketing cooperatives may be able to successfully facilitate the production of
high-quality agricultural products when members receive financial services that are unre-
lated to quality outcomes. Our findings suggest that the collective quality of cooperative-
produced goods can be raised by providing members with a greater level of baseline ser-
vices, which has significant policy implications when the return to providing baseline ser-




1Branding activities performed by marketing cooperatives differ by sector. In European
Union, cooperatives develop branded products in the dairy and wine sectors and, to a lesser
extent, in the fruit, vegetables and olive oil sectors (Hanisch and Rommel, 2003).
2Winemaking cooperatives typically purchase grapes from their members at market
prices, and then distribute surplus proceeds from wine sales back to members in proportion
to patronage (Hanisch and Rommel, 2003).
3By social sanctions, we consider sanctions imposed by the group as a result of moni-
toring and enforcement outcomes, as opposed to sactions by peers that involve individual
responses to defection in repeated games.
4Such games have not received much attention the literature, apart from notable contri-
butions in studying the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Kollock, 1998).
5An important consideration for any laboratory setting is external validity of our work.
From a methodological viewpoint, Kessler and Vesterlund (2015) argues that the relevant
criteria for laboratory studies is whether the qualitative results of the study are externally
valid (i.e., whether the sign of the effect would be the same in the lab and in the field).
Field experiments (in our case, experiments with members of a marketing cooperative) are
likely to produce qualitatively similar outcomes as lab experiments (Levitt and List, 2007).
6Ambrus and Greiner (2012) report that when noisy information on the subject’s contri-
bution is announced publicly, the sanction mechanism is efficient only when it is “strong”
(i.e. when the damage is three times higher than under the baseline punishment). Xiao and
Kunreuther (2016) find that a “restricted” regime of punishment (cooperators can punish
defectors) is less efficient when (all) the outcomes of the game are uncertain.
7There are numerous examples of services provided to members of marketing cooper-
atives. For example, marketing cooperatives often perform first-stage processing services,
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such as ginning cotton or hulling nuts, while others vertically integrate the processing and
marketing functions of the supply-chain (USDA, 2000).
8An important exception is Saitone and Sexton (2009), who consider the effect of mem-
bers’ remuneration on free riding on quantity of high-quality products.
9Fares and Orozco (2014) examine the effect of contracts on product quality among
wine cooperatives using a tournament mechanism and find that tournaments where produc-
ers can be promoted or demoted from high quality contracts provides stronger incentives
than monitoring to control the moral hazard problem.
10In this literature a monitoring mechanism is “perfect” when the subjects’ actions are
perfectly observable and when the subjects’ punishments are perfectly enforced.
11We assume here that the cooperative sells its products directly to final consumers. In
cases where the cooperative sells its product to retailers, α is the portion of ρ(NA)a that the
cooperative acquires from its bargaining power.
12For example, technicians in wine cooperatives engage in different tasks in collabo-
ration with each member. These technicians have an important role of providing advice
to wine growers on how to reduce production cost. Cooperative also provide other finan-
cial advantages, including regional subsidies for cooperatives located in EU countries (see
Hanisch and Rommel, 2003). Such services may be financed by others activities of the
cooperative, or by the membership fees.
13There are several interpretations of ρ(NA)a and p. Fu, Subramanian, and Venkateswaran
(2015) define ρ(NA)a as the “performance-sensitive” component of the employee’s com-
pensation, p+ ρ(NA)a, where a refers to the “pay-performance sensitivity”, while p is the
“performance-invariant” component of the compensation. Alternatively, following Tirole
(1996), p and ρ(NA)a may be interpreted, respectively, as the idiosyncratic values earned
through past and present reputation.
14To reduce the analysis to the cases where the payoff to action A can never be negative,
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we assume p ≥ cA.
15In practice, the member’s production is excluded from the “premium-quality” activity
of the cooperative. The member loses the services provided by the cooperative specifically
for this activity and the cooperative sells the member’s production at market price for a
standard quality product (generally a competitive price). This is particularly the case in co-
operatives that implement any pooling arrangement between the revenue of the “premium-
quality” activity and the revenue of the the “standard-quality” activity.
16Note that 0 < θ1(N) < θ2(N) < 1 for N > acA .
17Technically, there is also a third Nash equilibria for NA = n˜ in which some players
contribute and some players free ride. This situation can be an equilibrium only if n˜ is
exactly right, but it is strongly unstable (see Dixit, Skeath, and Reiley, 2009).
18This matching procedure corresponds to the so-called partner procedure. Most of
the recent experimental literature related to our study (e.g. Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson, and
Staffiero, 2010, Ambrus and Greiner, 2012, Croson et al., 2015) relies on essentially the
same matching procedure.
19This test consists of a menu of 10 paired lottery choices designed to make inferences
about risk preferences under various payment conditions.
20Part a) of figure 1. illustrates the partition of equilibrium for N=8 and p=2.
21Part b) of figure1. illustrates the partition of equilibrium for N=8 and p=4.
22Payoffs were displayed only when the play of the game started. During the reading of
the instructions, the payoffs in the tables were symbolized by letters.
23In all cases, we avoid the use of wording such as “probability of being monitored” or
“exclusion probability”.
24The payment to subjests was the cumulative sum of payoffs across all periods of the
game, which is a conventional payment scheme used in multitask experiments. An alter-
native payment scheme would involve randomly picking one or more periods of the game
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for subjects’ payoffs, which has the advantage of avoiding “portfolio” effects in subjects’
strategies. We use the cumulative payoff scheme because it is simpler to understand and
more closely matches payoffs through repeated interaction among members of marketing
cooperatives. Charness, Gneezy, and Halladay (2016) investigate the effect of “pay one
vs pay all” payment schemes on subjects’ actions in fourteen published laboratory experi-
ments and report qualitatively similar outcomes for the two, alternative schemes in 10 out
of 14 cases.
25In order to get their payoff for the Holt and Laury’s test, a computer program enabled
subjects to throw a 10-sided die twice: the first time to determine the relevant lottery, and
the second time to determine the payoff for the chosen action. This procedure of payment
was carried out at the end of the experiment, to ensure that the subjects’ behaviors in the
game were not influenced by their earnings in the risk test. Payoffs to lotteries were labeled
in Euros and were identical to those of Holt and Laury (2002).
26Examples of subjects’ payoff tables are available in the appendix.
27Prediction 3 states that an increase in the base payoff p should reduce the propensity
to free ride. It is especially interesting to test this prediction for intermediate levels of
the exclusion probability (θ = 0.25), because an increase in the base payoff is capable of
solving the coordination problem in this range.
28The null hypothesis cannot be rejected either when we run the test between the other
pairwise treatments.
29The Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in the frequency of
action B between the treatments [8; 0,45; 2] and [8; 0,45; 4] (p-value=0.07), albeit rather
weakly. Pooling the groups, the average frequency of choosing B is 27.08% when p = 2,
whereas it is 17.9% when p = 4.
30Recall that for each treatment we had several sessions, subjects were randomly selected
and allocated across treatments and sessions.
33
31While it is common practice to start the estimation with a linear probability model,
given the length of the article we opted to show those results in a supplemental web ap-
pendix.
32Note that in each session we had groups of 4 our 8 subjects clustered together. Given
that in our experimental design each subject only was exposed to one treatment, there could
be subjective specific variation so we also estimated the models clustering by individual.
The later results are shown in the web appendix.
33The risk variable is a quantitative variable that corresponds to the number of safe
choices made by the subjects in the Holt and Laury (2002)’s multiple prize list test.
34For this model we use data from session with 160 participants in total, each making 20
choices.
35Consistent with other studies using this test, our subjects are overwhelmingly risk
averse (73.7%). Only 11% of the subjects are risk neutral and 5% are risk loving. The
lack of correlation between risk attitudes and the decision to free ride on collective rents is
somewhat surprising.
36To test the robustness of our estimation estimated these models using time trends and
lags of the dependent variable. These are reported in a supplemental web appendix.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Experimental sessions and group observations
Dates Treatment [N ; θ; p] Nb of Sessions Nb of subjects Nb of observations
Feb. 16, 2014 [4; 0; 2] 1 16 4
Feb. 18, 2014 [8; 0; 2] 2 32 4
Feb. 18, 2014 [4; 0.45; 2] 1 16 4
Feb. 19, 2014 [8; 0.45; 2] 1 16 2
Feb. 20, 2014 [8; 0.45; 2] 1 16 2
Feb. 24, 2014 [4; 0.05; 2] 1 12 3
Feb. 24, 2014 [8; 0.05; 2] 1 16 2
Feb. 26, 2014 [8; 0.05; 2] 1 16 2
Feb. 27, 2014 [4; 0.25; 2] 1 16 4
Feb. 27, 2014 [8; 0.25; 2] 2 32 4
May 19, 2014 [4; 0; 2] 1 12 3
May 19, 2014 [8; 0.45; 2] 1 16 2
May 20, 2014 [4; 0.05; 2] 1 12 3
May 21, 2014 [8; 0.25; 2] 1 16 2
March 23, 2015 [8; 0.25; 4] 1 16 2
March 26, 2015 [8; 0.25; 4] 3 48 6
March 27, 2015 [8; 0.25; 4] 1 16 2
March 31, 2015 [8; 0.45; 4] 1 16 2
April 1, 2015 [8; 0.45; 4] 1 16 2
April 2, 2015 [8; 0.45; 4] 1 16 2
Total 24 372 57
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Table 2. Random effects Probit estimation for the choice of B for the pooled data with
robust standard errors clustered by session
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error) (Standard Error)






cons −1.659∗∗∗ −1.668∗∗∗ −1.863∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.215) (0.227)
Log likelihood -3559.65 -3559.61 -3550.96
ρ 0.454 0.454 0.455
Wald χ2 23.00∗∗∗ 26.8∗∗∗ 32.72∗∗∗
obs. 7440 7440 7440
Note: ∗∗∗Corresponds to the 1% significance level, ∗∗ to the 5% and ∗ to the 10%.
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Table 3. Random effects Probit estimation for the choice of B with robust standard
errors clustered by groups in each session
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err) (Std. Err) (Std. Err)
N 1.327∗∗∗ 1.322∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.188)
θ5 0.149 0.155 −0.09 −0.094 −0.094
(0.198) (0.201) (0.107) (0.11) (0.107)
θ25 −0.608∗∗∗ −0611∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.860∗∗∗ −0.578∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.191) (0.137) (0.13) (0.149)
θ45 −0.942∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −1.134∗∗∗ −0.915∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.198) (0.163) (0.16) (0.149)
period 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.0172) (0.172)
period2 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Risk −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0006 −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Base Payoff −0.450∗∗∗
(0.123)
cons −1.603∗∗∗ −1.612∗∗∗ −0.255∗ −0.236∗∗ −0.236∗∗
(0.276) (0.278) (0.86) (0.106) (0.106)
Log likelihood -3520.48 -3517.82 -1899.23 -3028.98 -3021.37
ρ 0.39 0.395 0.287 0.374 0.360
Wald χ2 109.39∗∗∗ 147.48∗∗∗ 55.29∗∗∗ 115.41∗∗∗ 144.34∗∗∗
obs. 7440 7440 3200 5760 5760
Note: ∗∗∗Corresponds to the 1% significance level, ∗∗ to the 5% and ∗ to the 10%.
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Table 4. Marginal effects of covariates for Models 2 (7440 obs.) and 3 (3200) 4 and 5
(5760 obs.)
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Marg. Effect Marg. Effect Marg. Effect Marg. Effect
(Std. Err) (Std. Err) (Std. Err) (Std. Err)
N 0.326
(0.043)
θ5 0.038 −0.029 -0.026 -0.026
(0.049) (0.035) (0.03) (0.030)
θ25 −0.15 −0.19 -0.239 -0.161
(0.047) (0.043) (0.033) (0.037)
θ45 −0.235 −0.277 -0.315 -0.256
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Appendix: Examples of subjects’ payoff tables
Matrix 1. Subjects’ payoff matrix in the treatment [4; 0; 2]
In my group, In my group, My payoff for My payoff for
number of number of
κ φ κ φ
4 0 1000
3 1 750 950
2 2 500 700
1 3 250 450
0 4 200
Note: In the experiment, actions A and B were labelled κ and φ, respectively. To make
their choice in each period, subjects had simply to click on screen buttons “κ” and “φ”
placed below this matrix.
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Matrix 2. Subjects’ payoff matrix in the treatment [4; 0.45; 2]
In my group, In my group, My payoff for κ My payoff for φ
number of number of
κ φ with 100/100 with 55/100 with 45/100
4 0 1000
3 1 750 950 0
2 2 500 700 0
1 3 250 450 0
0 4 200 0
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Matrix 3. Subjects’ payoff matrix in the treatment [8; 0; 2]
In my group, In my group, My payoff for My payoff for
number of number of
κ φ κ φ
8 0 1000
7 1 875 1075
6 2 750 950
5 3 625 825
4 4 500 700
3 5 375 575
2 6 250 450
1 7 125 325
0 8 200
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Matrix 4. Subjects’ payoff matrix in the treatment [8; 0.45; 2]
In my group, In my group, My payoff for κ My payoff for φ
number of number of
κ φ with 100/100 with 55/100 with 45/100
8 0 1000
7 1 875 1075 0
6 2 750 950 0
5 3 625 825 0
4 4 500 700 0
3 5 375 575 0
2 6 250 450 0
1 7 125 325 0
0 8 200 0
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Matrix 5. Subjects’ payoff matrix in the treatment [8; 0.25; 4]
In my group, In my group, My payoff for κ My payoff for φ
number of number of
κ φ with 100/100 with 75/100 with 25/100
8 0 1200
7 1 1075 1275 0
6 2 950 1150 0
5 3 825 1025 0
4 4 700 900 0
3 5 575 775 0
2 6 450 650 0
1 7 325 525 0
0 8 400 0
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